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Abstract—The threat of attack faced by cyber-physical systems
(CPSs), especially when they play a critical role in automating
public infrastructure, has motivated research into a wide variety
of attack defence mechanisms. Assessing their effectiveness is
challenging, however, as realistic sets of attacks to test them
against are not always available. In this paper, we propose smart
fuzzing, an automated, machine learning guided technique for
systematically finding ‘test suites’ of CPS network attacks, with-
out requiring any knowledge of the system’s control programs
or physical processes. Our approach uses predictive machine
learning models and metaheuristic search algorithms to guide
the fuzzing of actuators so as to drive the CPS into different
unsafe physical states. We demonstrate the efficacy of smart
fuzzing by implementing it for two real-world CPS testbeds—a
water purification plant and a water distribution system—finding
attacks that drive them into 27 different unsafe states involving
water flow, pressure, and tank levels, including six that were not
covered by an established attack benchmark. Finally, we use our
approach to test the effectiveness of an invariant-based defence
system for the water treatment plant, finding two attacks that
were not detected by its physical invariant checks, highlighting a
potential weakness that could be exploited in certain conditions.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical systems, fuzzing, testing, bench-
mark generation, machine learning, metaheuristic optimisation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are characterised by com-
putational elements and physical processes that are deeply
intertwined, each potentially involving different spatial and
temporal scales, modalities, and interactions [1]. These com-
plex systems are now ubiquitous in modern life, with examples
found in fields as diverse as aerospace, autonomous vehicles,
and medical monitoring. CPSs are also commonly used to
automate aspects of critical civil infrastructure, such as water
treatment or the management of electricity demand [2]. Given
the potential to cause massive disruption, such systems have
become prime targets for cyber attackers, with a number of
successful cases reported in recent years [3], [4].
This pervasive threat faced by CPSs has motivated research
and development into a wide variety of attack defence mech-
anisms, including techniques based on anomaly detection [5],
[6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], fingerprint-
ing [16], [17], [18], [19], and monitoring conditions or physi-
cal invariants [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27]. The
practical utility of these different countermeasures ultimately
depends on how effective they are at their principal goal:
detecting and/or preventing attacks. Unfortunately, assessing
this experimentally is not always straightforward, even with
access to an actual CPS, because of the need for realistic
attacks to evaluate them against. Herein lies the problem:
where exactly should such a set of attacks come from?
One possible solution is to use existing attack benchmarks
and datasets, as have been made available by researchers for
different CPS testbeds [28], [29], and as have been used in
the evaluation of different countermeasures, e.g. [7], [12],
[13]. Across these examples, attackers are typically assumed
to have compromised the communication links to some extent,
and thus can manipulate the sensor readings and actuator
commands exchanged across the network. The attacks within
these benchmarks, however, are manually constructed, whether
by engineers with sufficient expertise in the CPS, or through
invited hackathons to discover new attacks from those without
insider bias [30]. Both methods are inherently time consuming,
and difficult to generalise: constructing a similar benchmark
for a new CPS essentially requires starting from scratch.
In this paper, we propose smart fuzzing, an automated,
machine learning (ML) guided approach for constructing ‘test
suites’ (or benchmarks) of CPS network attacks, without
requiring any specific system expertise other than knowing
the normal operational ranges of sensors. Our technique uses
predictive machine learning models and metaheuristic search
to intelligently fuzz actuator commands, and systematically
drive the system into different categories of unsafe physical
states. Smart fuzzing consists of two broad steps. First, we
learn a model of the CPS by training ML algorithms on
physical data logs that characterise its normal behaviour. The
learnt model can be used to predict how the current physical
state will evolve with respect to different actuator configura-
tions. Second, we fuzz the actuators over the network to find
attack sequences that drive the system into a targeted unsafe
state. This fuzzing is guided by the learnt model: potential
manipulations of the actuators are searched for (e.g. with a
genetic algorithm [31]), and then the model predicts which of
them would drive the CPS closest to the unsafe state.
Our design for smart fuzzing was driven by four key
requirements. First, that it should be general, in the sense
that it can be implemented for different CPSs and a variety
of sensors and actuators. Second, that the approach should
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be comprehensive, in that the suites of attacks it constructs
should systematically cover different categories of sensed
physical properties, rather than just a select few. Third, that it
should be efficient, with each attack achieving its goal quickly,
posing additional challenge for countermeasures. Finally, that
it should be practically useful, in that it is straightforward to
implement for real CPSs without any formal specification or
specific technical expertise, and that the ‘test suites’ of attacks
are of comparable quality to expert-crafted benchmarks, thus
a reasonable basis for assessing attack defence mechanisms.
To evaluate our approach against these requirements, we
implemented it for two CPS testbeds. First, the Secure Water
Treatment (SWaT) testbed [32], a fully operational water
treatment plant consisting of 42 sensors and actuators, able
to produce five gallons of drinking water per minute. Second,
the Water Distribution (WADI) testbed [33], a scaled-down
version of a typical water distribution network for a city,
built for investigating attacks on consumer water supplies
with respect to patterns of peak and off-peak demand. The
designs of these testbeds were based on real-world industrial
purification plants and distribution networks, and thus reflect
many of their complexities. We found that smart fuzzing could
automatically identify suites of attacks that drove these CPSs
into 27 different unsafe states involving water flow, pressure,
tank levels, and consumer supply. Furthermore, it covered six
unsafe states beyond those in an established expert-crafted
benchmark [29]. Finally, we evaluated the utility of smart
fuzzing for testing attack defence mechanisms by launching it
with SWaT’s invariant-based monitoring system enabled [24],
[34]. Our approach was able to identify two attacks that
evaded detection by its physical invariant checks, highlighting
a potential weakness that could be exploited by attackers with
the capabilities to bypass its other conditions.
Summary of Contributions. We propose smart fuzzing,
which to the best of our knowledge, is the first general black-
box technique for automatically constructing test suites (or
benchmarks) of network attacks for different CPSs. While
fuzzing itself is not a new idea, our work differs in its focus
on CPS actuators, and the use of ML models to guide the
process and find attacks covering multiple different goals. We
implemented smart fuzzing for two real-world CPS testbeds,
identifying attacks that drive them into 27 different unsafe
states, including six that were not present in an expert-crafted
benchmark. Using the approach, we discovered two potential
exploits in an established invariant-based monitoring system,
suggesting the potential utility of smart fuzzing for testing CPS
attack defence mechanisms.
For researchers, our work provides a general way of con-
structing attack benchmarks for CPSs, which in turn could be
used in the experimental evaluation of novel attack defence
mechanisms. For plant engineers, it provides a practical means
of assessing a system’s robustness against a variety of network
attacks spanning several different goals. For the ML and search
communities, it demonstrates that existing techniques can be
used together to overcome the complexities of real CPSs.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATIONAL EXAMPLE
Here, we clarify our assumptions of CPSs and fuzzing,
before introducing our real-world CPS case studies, SWaT and
WADI. We discuss an example of smart fuzzing on SWaT.
CPSs and Fuzzing. We define CPSs as systems in which
algorithmic control and physical processes are tightly inte-
grated. Concretely, we assume that they consist of computa-
tional elements (the ‘cyber’ part) such as programmable logic
controllers (PLCs), distributed over a network, and interacting
with their processes via sensors and actuators (the ‘physical’
part). The operation of a CPS is controlled by its PLCs, which
receive readings from sensors that observe the physical state,
and then compute appropriate commands to send along the
network to the relevant actuators. We assume that the sensors
read continuous data (e.g. temperature, pressure, flow) and that
the states of the actuators are discrete.
These characteristics together make CPSs very difficult to
reason about: while individual control components (e.g. PLC
programs) may be simple in isolation, reasoning about the
behaviour of the whole system can only be done with consid-
eration of how its physical processes evolve and interact. This
often requires considerable domain-specific expertise beyond
the knowledge of a typical computer scientist, which is one
of our principal motivations for achieving full automation.
Fuzzing, which plays a key role in our solution, is in gen-
eral an automated testing technique that attempts to identify
potential crashes or assertion violations by generating diverse
and unexpected inputs for a given system [35]. Many of the
most well-known tools perform fuzzing on programs, e.g. [36],
[37], but in the context of CPSs, we consider fuzzing at the
network level. In particular, we consider the fuzzing of their
actuators with commands that did not originate from the PLCs
(and in fact override any valid commands that they are trying
to send). Furthermore, the goal of our fuzzing differs in that
we are trying to drive physical sensors out of their safe ranges,
using an underlying method that is ML-guided.
SWaT and WADI Testbeds. Two CPSs that satisfy the
aforementioned assumptions, and thus will form the case
studies of this paper, are Secure Water Treatment (SWaT) [32]
and Water Distribution (WADI) [33], testbeds built for cyber-
security research. SWaT (Figure 1) is a fully operational water
treatment plant with the capability of producing five gallons
of safe drinking water per minute, whereas WADI is a water
distribution network that supplies consumers with 10 gallons
of drinking water per minute. The testbeds are scaled-down
versions of actual water treatment and distribution plants in a
city, and exhibit many of their complexities.
SWaT treats water across six distinct but co-operating
stages, involving a variety of complex chemical processes,
such as de-chlorination, reverse osmosis, and ultrafiltration.
Each stage is controlled by a dedicated Allen-Bradley Con-
trolLogix PLC, which communicates with the sensors and
actuators relevant to that stage over a ring network, and
Fig. 1. The Secure Water Treatment (SWaT) testbed
with other PLCs over a star network, using an EtherNet/IP
protocol specific to the manufacturer. Each PLC cycles through
its program, computing the appropriate commands to send
to actuators based on the latest sensor readings received as
input. The system consists of 42 sensors and actuators in
total, with sensors monitoring physical properties such as tank
levels, flow, pressure, and pH values, and actuators including
motorised valves (for opening an inflow pipe) and pumps (for
emptying a tank). A historian regularly records the sensor
readings and actuator commands during SWaT’s operation,
facilitating data logs for offline analyses and machine learning.
SCADA software and tools developed by Rockwell Automa-
tion are available to support analysis and experimentation.
WADI consists of three distinct processes each controlled
by a National Instruments PLC. The first stage consists of
two 2500 litre water tanks, which receive water from external
sources. Water from these tanks feed through to two elevated
reservoirs in the second stage, which then supply six consumer
tanks based on a pre-set pattern of demand (e.g. peak and off-
peak usage). After meeting each consumer’s demand, water is
drained to the return water tank in the third stage. This water
can then be pumped back to stage one for re-use.
The sensors in both testbeds are associated with
manufacturer-defined ranges of safe values, which in normal
operation, they are expected to remain within. If a sensor
reports a (true) reading outside of this range, we say the
physical state of the CPS has become unsafe. If a level
indicator transmitter, for example, reports that the tank in stage
one has become more than a certain percentage full (or empty),
then the physical state has become unsafe due to the risk of
an overflow (resp. underflow). Unsafe pressure states indicate
the risk of a pipe bursting, and unsafe levels of water flow
indicate the risk of possible cascading effects in other parts of
the system. In WADI, unsafe flow levels may also indicate that
a particular consumer’s water supply has been compromised.
A number of countermeasures have been developed to
prevent SWaT or WADI from entering unsafe states. Ghaeini
and Tippenhauer [38], for example, monitor the network traffic
with a hierarchical intrusion detection system, and Ahmed
et al. [16], [17] detect attacks by fingerprinting sensor and
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Fig. 2. Some interconnected components of SWaT’s first three stages
process noise. Other approaches learn models from physical
data logs, and use them to evaluate whether or not the current
state represents normal behaviour or not: most (e.g. [7], [12],
[39]) use unsupervised learning to construct these models,
although Chen et al. [23], [25] use supervised learning by
automatically seeding faults in the control programs (of a
high-fidelity simulator). Adepu and Mathur [21], [22], [24]
systematically and manually derive a comprehensive set of
physics-based invariants and other conditions that relate the
states of actuators and sensors, with any violations of them
during operation reported. This attack defence mechanism has
been successfully deployed in professional SWaT hackathons,
detecting 14 out of the 16 physical process attacks devised
by experienced practitioners from academia and industry [30].
Feng et al. [40] also generate invariants, but use an approach
based on learning and data mining that can capture noise in
sensor measurements more easily than manual approaches.
Smart Fuzzing Example. To illustrate how our approach
works in practice, we informally describe how it is able to
automatically find an attack for overflowing a tank in the
first stage of SWaT. Figure 2 depicts the relationship between
some interconnected components across the first three stages.
It includes some sensors: Level Indicator Transmitters (LITs)
for reporting the levels of different tanks; and Flow Indi-
cator Transmitters (FITs) for reporting the flow of water
in some pipes. It also includes some actuators: Motorised
Valves (MVs), which if open, allow water to pass through; and
a Pump (P101), which if on, pumps water out of the preceding
tank. The physical flow of water throughout this subpart of
the system is controlled by some inter-communicating PLCs.
If the value of LIT301 becomes too low, for example, the PLC
controlling valve MV201 will open it. Furthermore, the PLC
controlling pump P101 will switch it on to pump additional
water through, causing the value of LIT301 to rise.
Before launching our smart fuzzer, two choices must be
made: first, what is the attack goal (characterised as a fitness
function); and second, which search algorithm should be used
to identify actuator configurations that achieve it? As our goal
is to overflow the tank monitored by LIT101, we must define
a fitness function on the sensor readings that is maximised
as we get closer to overflowing the tank. A simple function
achieving this takes as input a vector of predicted sensor
states 〈LIT101,LIT301, . . . ,FIT101,FIT201, . . . 〉 and re-
turns simply the value of LIT101. As our search strategy, we
choose to randomly search over the space of actuator config-
urations. At this point, the user has nothing more to set up.
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Fig. 3. Inputs/outputs of a learnt model
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Fig. 4. Overview of our ML-guided actuator fuzzing (details of any particular
search algorithm are omitted here)
Upon launching the fuzzer, several different configurations
of the system’s actuators are (randomly) generated. For each
set of configurations, a model is used to predict the future
sensor readings that they would lead to. Our fitness function is
maximised by future states with the highest LIT101 readings,
which in Figure 2, would result from a configuration where
MV101 is open, P101 is off, P102 is off, and P601 is on (as
water will be flowing into the tank, but the pumps will not be
removing it). Note that P102 and P601 are not pictured: the
former is a backup pump (redundancy for P101); the latter is a
pump for driving in water from stage 6. With suitable actuator
configurations identified, the relevant commands to apply
them are spoofed over the network: OPEN MV101, OFF P101,
OFF P102, and ON P601. Eventually, LIT101 will enter its
upper unsafe range (risk of overflow), i.e. the attack goal.
III. HOW SMART FUZZING WORKS
Our approach for automatically finding network attacks on
CPSs consists of two broad steps in turn: learning and fuzzing.
In the first step, we learn a model of the CPS that can predict
the effects of actuator configurations on the physical state,
as summarised in Figure 3. The model takes as input the
current readings of all sensors and a proposed configuration
of the actuators, returning as output a prediction of the sensor
readings that would result from adopting that configuration for
a fixed time interval. The idea is that this model can later be
used to analyse different potential actuator configurations, and
help inform which of them is likely to drive the system closer
to a targeted unsafe state. To learn this model, we extract a
time series of sensor and actuator data from the system logs
and train a suitable machine learning algorithm.
The second step of our approach searches for commands to
fuzz the actuators with that will drive the CPS into an unsafe
physical state. The sub-steps of this part are summarised in
Figure 4. To find the right commands, our approach applies
a search algorithm over the space of actuator configurations,
returning the configuration that is predicted by the model (of
the first step) to drive the CPS the closest to an unsafe state.
We explore different search algorithms for this task, including
random, but also metaheuristic (e.g. genetic algorithms) given
that the state space of actuators can grow quite large (e.g. 226
possible configurations in SWaT). We use fitness functions to
evaluate predicted sensor states with respect to the attack goal.
Assumptions. Given that smart fuzzing, ultimately, is intended
to generate attacks for evaluating CPS defence solutions, it
is important to detail our assumptions about systems and
attackers, thus characterising the kinds of attacks that will be
found (and just as importantly, those that will not be).
In the learning phase of our approach, we assume the total
integrity of the data that the machine learning models are
trained on (i.e. an attacker has not manipulated the learning
of the model). In the fuzzing phase, we search for network
attacks that could be executed by attackers that are able
to compromise the communication links between PLCs and
actuators. In particular, we assume that attackers can monitor
all genuine sensor readings and actuator commands, and can
also inject arbitrary actuator commands at will, controlling
their operation independently of any PLC. Furthermore, we
assume that genuine commands originating from PLCs can
be intercepted and blocked from ever reaching the actuators.
Note that while in general we assume a rather powerful
attacker, it is possible to use our technique with more restricted
capabilities too (e.g. particular actuators or stages only), in
order to test defence mechanisms in a more realistic context
(see e.g. Section IV-B, RQ5). Attacks of this kind have been
reported in practice, e.g. the discovery that infiltrators had
“manipulated the valves controlling the flow of chemicals”
in an industrial water treatment plant [3]. Furthermore, our
focus on compromised actuators can lead to classes of attacks
difficult for control theoretic defences to detect, e.g. [26].
While our approach searches for attacks based on manipu-
lating actuators, it is possible to implement identified attacks
in more indirect ways too. For example, instead of spoofing
actuator commands over the network, one could spoof a sensor
reading so that the system will issue the desired command to
the actuator itself. One could also modify some PLC code
to cause it to issue the same commands [41], [42], [43] (thus
testing any code attestation mechanisms), or could have a user
physically interfering with the plant equipment (i.e. testing for
insider threats).
A. Step One: Learning a Prediction Model
Data Collection. Our method requires a dataset from which
the relationship between actuators and the evolution of the
physical state can be learnt. A suitable raw format for such data
is a time series of sensor readings and actuator configurations,
recorded at regular intervals during the regular operation of
the CPS. The required size of the time series depends upon
how many ‘modes’ of behaviour the system exhibits, and
how quickly the effects of actuator commands are propagated
through the physical state. In general, logs from several days
of operation may be sufficient to span enough of the system’s
normal operational behaviour.
Since our method is aimed at engineers or researchers
who are seeking to assess the defences of a CPS (i.e. not
an external attacker), we assume that such data is readily
available, e.g. from the system’s historian. But in principle, it
could also be collected by monitoring the network traffic. The
data could also be augmented by injecting manipulations at
this stage, so their effects can be incorporated into the learning.
We choose not to do this, however, so as to avoid biasing our
approach towards pre-determined attacks.
For SWaT and WADI, time series datasets are already avail-
able online [29], and were obtained by running the testbeds
non-stop for seven (resp. 14) days without any interruption
from attacks or faults. The datasets include the states of all
sensors and actuators as recorded by the historians every 1s.
Training a Model. Our method requires a model with the
input/output relation of Figure 3. As long as the predictions
have a high degree of accuracy, however, the particular choice
of algorithm for learning that model is immaterial. In this
paper, we consider two different ML algorithms that are
popular and well-suited for the particular form of training
data—a time series of actuator states and (continuous) sensor
values. First, we consider a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)
network [44], a deep learning model with an architecture
that supports the learning of longer-term dependencies in the
data. Second, we consider a Support Vector Regression (SVR)
model [45], an extension of support vector machines for
handling continuous values (instead of classification).
To apply these ML algorithms to a dataset, the sensor and
actuator values must be extracted from the raw logs into a fixed
vector format. As we want to learn the relation between actua-
tor states and the evolution of sensor values, a possible form of
the vector is 〈〈s0, s1, s2, . . . , a0, a1, a2, . . . 〉, 〈s′0, s′1, s′2, . . . 〉〉,
where the sis and ais are the readings/states of sensors and
actuators at time point t, and the s′is are the readings of the
same sensors but at time point t + i for some fixed time
interval i. Depending on the particular algorithm, the sensor
values may also need to be normalised. After extracting as
many vectors as possible from the raw data, as is typical
in learning, the algorithm should only be trained on a fixed
portion of them (e.g. 80%), leaving the remainder as test data
for assessing the accuracy of the learnt model’s predictions.
For SWaT and WADI, we trained two sets of LSTM and
SVR models using standard Python library implementations:
the Keras neural networks API [46] and scikit-learn [47]
respectively. We extracted vectors for training from days 2–
5 of the SWaT dataset and from days 5–10 of WADI’s, with
vectors from the remaining days reserved for testing the learnt
models. Our two LSTM models used a traditional architecture
consisting of an LSTM layer followed by a dense, fully-
connected layer, and took approximately two days of training
on a GTX 1070 Ti GPU for each testbed. The accuracy of
both models was measured as 97% (with a tolerance between
the actual and predicted values of 5%). Our two SVR models
took approximately half a day each to train, and upon testing,
their accuracy was measured as 94% for SWaT and 97% for
WADI (again, with a tolerance of 5%).
We remark that in our SWaT/WADI implementations, in
addition to learning models able to predict all the sensor values
〈s′0, s′1, s′2, . . . 〉, we also learnt a series of simpler models
that predict only 〈s′0〉, or 〈s′1〉, or 〈s′2〉, or . . . . These models
are useful in later experiments (Section IV) when the fuzzer
is attempting to drive one sensor in particular to an unsafe
state, since they can provide the necessary predictions more
efficiently, and are also faster to learn (5-10 minutes on an off-
the-shelf laptop). Furthermore, for SVR, it allowed us to vary
the time interval in predictions for different sensors. While
most were set at 1s (as for LSTM), we found that we needed a
larger interval of 100s in SVR for the water tank level sensors,
due to the fact that tank levels change more slowly. (This is
only an issue for SVR, since the architecture of LSTM is
specially designed to handle long lags between events.)
B. Step Two: Fuzzing to Find Attacks
Fitness Functions. Our approach uses fitness functions to
quantify how close some (predicted) sensor readings are to
an unsafe state we wish to reach. Intuitively, a fitness function
takes a vector of sensor values as input, and returns a number
that is larger the ‘closer’ the input is to an unsafe state.
The goal of a search algorithm is then to find actuator
configurations that are predicted (by the LSTM/SVR models)
to bring about sensor states that maximise the fitness function.
Fitness functions are manually defined for the CPS under
consideration, and should characterise precisely what an un-
safe state is. There is a great deal of flexibility in how they
are defined: it is possible to define them in terms of the unsafe
ranges of individual sensors, of groups of related sensors, or
of different combinations therein. In this paper, we perform
smart fuzzing using fitness functions for the individual sensors
in turn, to ensure a suitable variety of attacks, and to avoid the
problem of a single sensor always dominating (e.g. because it
is easier to attack).
Defining a fitness function for a single sensor s is straight-
forward. If its unsafe range consists of all the values above a
certain threshold, then a suitable fitness function would be the
sensor reading s itself, since maximising it brings it closer
to (or beyond) that threshold. If its unsafe range consists
of values below a certain threshold, then a suitable fitness
function would be the negation of the sensor reading, −s.
A general fitness function can be defined for any group of
the system’s sensors. Let vs denote the current value of sensor
s, Ls denote its lower safety threshold, Hs denote its upper
safety threshold, and rs = Hs − Ls denote its range of safe
values. Let
ds =
{
min (|vs − Ls| , |vs −Hs|) Ls ≤ vs ≤ Hs
0 otherwise
Algorithm 1: GA for Actuator Configurations
Input: Vector of sensor readings S, prediction model M ,
fitness function f , population size n, no. of parents k,
mutation probability pm
Output: Vector of actuator configurations
1 Randomly generate population P of n actuator configurations;
2 Compute fitness of each candidate c ∈ P with f(M(S, c));
3 repeat
4 Select k parents from P using Roulette Wheel Selection;
5 Generate new candidates from parents using crossover;
6 Generate new candidates from parents using bit flip
mutation with probability pm;
7 Compute fitness of new candidates c with f(M(S, c));
8 Replace P with the n fittest of the new and old candidates;
9 until timeout;
10 return candidate c ∈ P that maximises f(M(S, c));
i.e. the absolute distance of the sensor reading from the nearest
safety threshold. Then, the fitness function for a set S of the
CPS’s sensors is
∑
s∈S
1
ds/rs
. This function tends to infinity
as individual sensor readings get closer to either their lower
or upper safety thresholds. In other words, the fitness function
returns an increasingly large number as the system moves in
the direction of an unsafe state.
For SWaT and WADI, we defined fitness functions on a
per-sensor basis, and treated the values above and below these
thresholds as two separate cases. We did this for two reasons:
first, to ensure that smart fuzzing can find attacks that violate
each sensor in both ways (where applicable); and second, as
it increases the diversity of attacks in cases where it is much
easier to attack a sensor in one direction. We remark that a
preliminary investigation found more general fitness functions
(e.g. favouring any kind of attack) not to be useful for SWaT or
WADI, as the attacks found by smart fuzzing were dominated
by sensors that were easier to drive to unsafe ranges, such as
the water flow indicators in the first stage.
Searching and Fuzzing. We consider two different algorithms
for searching across the space of actuator configurations. First,
we consider a simple random search, in which several config-
urations of actuators are randomly generated. The network is
then fuzzed to apply the configuration that is predicted (by the
LSTM/SVR model) to maximise the fitness function.
Second, we consider a genetic algorithm (GA) [31], a
metaheuristic search inspired by the “survival of the fittest”
principle from the theory of natural selection. The high-level
steps of our particular GA for finding actuator configurations
are summarised in Algorithm 1. First, a population of actuator
configurations is randomly generated. We assume in this paper
that the states of actuators are discrete, allowing us to encode
each solution as a simple bit vector (e.g. 0001100011001 . . . ).
Most actuators can only be in one of two states and thus need
only one bit in the vector (i.e. 0 for off, 1 for on), though some
actuators (e.g. modulating control valves) have more states and
need additional bits in the encoding. Next, we calculate the
fitness of each candidate in the population by: (1) applying
the LSTM/SVR model; then (2) applying the fitness function
to the resulting predicted state.
At this point we enter the main loop, in which the fittest
candidates are selected for generating “offspring” from. We
select the candidates using roulette wheel selection [31], which
assigns to each candidate a probability of being selected based
on its fitness. If fi is the fitness of one of the n candidates,
then its probability of being selected is fi/
∑n
j=1 fj . Next,
we sample candidates based on the probabilities using the
following implementation. First, a random number is generated
between 0 and the sum of the candidates’ fitness scores.
Then, we iterate through the population, until the accumulated
fitness score is larger than that number. At this point we stop,
selecting the last candidate as a “parent”. We repeat this until
we have selected k parents (possibly including duplicates).
From the parents, we generate new candidates (offspring) by
applying crossover and mutation. In the former, we randomly
choose a point in the bit vectors of two parents, and swap the
sub-vectors to the right of it. In the latter, we randomly flip
a bit (from 0 to 1 or vice versa) with some fixed probability,
pm. The fitness of all the new candidates is calculated, then the
n fittest candidates from the old and the new candidates are
carried forward as the new population, with the other, less fit
candidates all eliminated. This iteration continues until a fixed
timeout is reached. The fittest actuator configuration is then
returned, and the relevant commands to apply it are issued.
For SWaT, implementing the search algorithms was rela-
tively straightforward, especially as its actuators consist only
of binary states (on or off) and can be encoded directly as bit
vectors. For WADI the same is true, except for its modulating
control valve feeds: these are set to an integer between 0 and
100, so we encoded their states as 7 bit binary numbers. For
both the random and GA searches, we set a timeout of 10s,
after which the best actuator configuration found so far would
be the one that is applied. While this 10s timeout is clearly
longer than the 1s prediction time interval of our models
(except for the 100s time interval for tank levels in SVR),
the predictions are still meaningful because the physical states
of the testbeds evolve so slowly in the meantime. For CPSs
that change faster, a longer prediction time interval may need
to be considered for the search to remain practically useful.
In our GA implementation, we set the population size as
n = 100, number of parents as k = 100, and the mutation
probability as 0.1. These parameters were chosen to ensure
that the algorithm will converge before the 10s timeout. For
WADI, any mutation that would change a modulating control
valve’s value to something outside of its range is rejected.
Furthermore, we cap the maximum number of iterations at
100 (if reached before the timeout).
Once our random or GA search algorithm identifies the
fittest actuator configuration, we use the Python package
pycomm [48] to fuzz the actuators over the network. As long
as the system continues to approach the targeted unsafe state,
the actuator configuration is held; otherwise, the search is
repeated to identify a more fruitful configuration.
IV. EVALUATION
We evaluate the effectiveness of smart fuzzing on the SWaT
and WADI testbeds (Section II).
A. Research Questions
Our evaluation addresses five research questions based on
our original design requirements for smart fuzzing (Section I):
RQ1 (Efficiency): How quickly is smart fuzzing able to
find a targeted attack?
RQ2 (Comprehensiveness): How many unsafe states can
the attacks of smart fuzzing cover?
RQ3 (Setup): Which combinations of model and search
algorithm are most effective?
RQ4 (Comparisons): How do the attacks compare against
those of other approaches or those in benchmarks?
RQ5 (Utility): Are the discovered attacks useful for testing
CPS attack detection mechanisms?
RQs 1–2 consider whether smart fuzzing achieves its principal
goal of finding network attacks. We assess this from two
different angles: first, in terms of how quickly it is able to drive
the CPS into a particular unsafe state; and second, in terms of
how many different unsafe states the attacks can cover. RQ 3
considers how different setups of smart fuzzing (i.e. different
models or search algorithms) impact its ability to find attacks.
RQ 4 compares the effectiveness of smart fuzzing against
other approaches: first, the baseline of randomly mutating
actuator states without reference to a model of the system;
and second, an established, manually constructed benchmark
of attacks [29]. Finally, RQ 5 investigates whether the attacks
found by smart fuzzing are useful for testing existing cyberse-
curity defence mechanisms. We assess this final question using
SWaT, as practical defence mechanisms are more established
for this testbed; in particular, its “Water Defense” invariant-
based detection solution [34], [24].
B. Experiments and Discussion
We designed three experiments for the SWaT and WADI
testbeds to evaluate our research questions. The programs
we built to perform these experiments and all supplementary
material are available online to download [49].
Experiment #1: RQs 1–3. In our first experiment, we sys-
tematically target the different possible unsafe sensor ranges
in SWaT and WADI, using our tools in four different mod-
el/search setups: LSTM-GA, LSTM-Random, SVR-GA, and
SVR-Random (see Section III). Our goal is to collate the data
and obtain an overall picture of how the different ML-guided
setups perform, how quickly targeted attacks are found, and
how many different unsafe states are covered.
For each of the setups and fitness functions (usually two
per sensor, targeting the lower and upper safety thresholds
separately), we ran the experiment as follows. First, we “reset”
the testbed by operating it normally until all sensors enter their
safe ranges. Upon reaching this state, we launch the fuzzer
with the given setup and fitness function, and let it run without
interference for up to 20 minutes (long enough to ensure that
over/underflow attacks are able to complete). If the unsafe
state targeted by the fitness function is reached within that
time, we disable the fuzzer and record the time point at which
the transition to unsafe state occurred. (If other sensors happen
to enter their unsafe states along the way, we record this too,
but do not disable the fuzzer for them.) Once the fuzzer is
disabled, the testbed is allowed to reset and return to a safe
state. We repeat these steps 10 times for every combination of
fuzzer setup and fitness function, and record the median so as
to remove biases resulting from differences in starting states.
For WADI, we note that we use slightly different fitness
functions for the flow sensors 2 FQ 101, 2 FQ 201, . . . ,
2 FQ 601 which monitor the supply of the testbed’s consumer
tanks. Here, the goal is not simply to disrupt the supply of a
consumer (e.g. maximising −s for the targeted sensor s), but
rather to do so without disrupting the supplies of any others.
If targeting the first consumer tank, for example, this goal
is expressed by the fitness function: 12 FQ 101 ∗ 2 FQ 201 ∗
2 FQ 301 ∗ · · · ∗ 2 FQ 601, which is maximised when the
supply of the first consumer tank is cut off, while remaining
sensitive to any possible (unwanted) effects on the other tanks.
Results. The results of this experiment are given in the first
four rows of Tables I and II. The rows denote the different
smart fuzzing setups, whereas the columns denote the different
possible unsafe states that were targeted for each sensor.
These include: Flow Indicator Transmitters (FITs/FQs), which
measure water flow in pipes and can become too High or Low;
a Differential Pressure Sensor (DPIT), which can become too
High or Low; and Level Indicator Transmitters (LITs/LTs),
which measure the water levels of tanks, and can indicate a
risk of Overflow or Underflow. We do not include the Analyser
Indicator Transmitters (AITs), which measure properties such
as pH, as the testbeds currently take raw water from the mains
(i.e. already close to pH 7); as a result, the readings barely
vary during the plant’s operation. The numbers indicate the
amount of time taken, in seconds, for a particular fuzzing
setup to reach a targeted unsafe state; they are the medians
obtained from 10 repetitions per combination of fuzzing setup
and fitness function. Numbers indicated with an asterisk (∗)
indicate that one or more repetitions that were unable to
reach the unsafe state within 20 minutes. Furthermore, 1200+
indicates that despite approaching the given unsafe state, none
of the repetitions were able to cross the threshold.
For most of the targeted unsafe states, the perfor-
mance (RQ1, RQ3) of smart fuzzing across the four different
setups is essentially the same. This suggests that for a system
of the testbeds’ complexity, having some reasonably accurate
prediction model and a lightweight search algorithm (e.g. ran-
dom) is sufficient to identify several attacks.
Attacks covering most of the individual sensors can
be discovered using an ML model together with a
simple search algorithm (e.g. random).
There is one exception to report: the LSTM-GA and SVR-
GA setups noticeably outperformed their Random variants at
driving SWaT’s water tank level sensor LIT301 into an unsafe
TABLE I
RESULTS: MEDIAN TIME TAKEN (S) TO DRIVE SWAT’S FLOW, DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE, AND LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTERS INTO UNSAFE STATES
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LSTM-GA 14 17 20 14 7 17 16 5 12 333 496 729 511 1200+ 1200+
LSTM-Random 15 18 21∗ 14 8 19 14 5 14 339 618 697 526 1200+ 1200+
SVR-GA 13 10 16 13 7 16 16 5 11 385 439 696 569 1200+ 1200+
SVR-Random 15 12 21 14 7 19 16 5 12 337 577 681 655 1200+ 1200+
O
th
er Random (No Model) 15 20 — 15 — — — 5 — 435 — — — — —
Benchmark [29] 14 18 — 14 18 — — — — 454∗ 771∗ 1200+ — — 1200+
TABLE II
RESULTS: MEDIAN TIME TAKEN (S) TO DRIVE WADI INTO UNSAFE FLOW/LEVEL STATES, AND TO CUT THE SUPPLY OF SPECIFIC CONSUMERS
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LSTM-GA 9 7 7 9 8 1200+ 879 1200+ 801 1200+ 746† 15 15 15 15 15 15
LSTM-Random 8 7 7 9 8 1200+ 744 1200+ 799 1200+ 746† — — — — — —
SVR-GA 8 7 7 9 9 1200+ 841 1200+ 731 1200+ 746 15 15 15 16 15 16
SVR-Random 9 7 7 9 9 1200+ 904 1200+ 767 1200+ 746† — — — — — —
Oth. Random (No Model) 8 7 7 — 8 — — — — — — — — — — — —
state for overflow (Table I). In comparison to other sensors,
there are fewer configurations of actuators that can drive
LIT301 into its overflow range (since the sensor is relevant to
four of the six stages); they are harder to find by “accident”
(as in a random search), which we believe is why the fuzzing
setups applying metaheuristic search were more performant.
The four fuzzing setups were able to cover the same number
of unsafe states (RQ2, RQ3), but with one exception: when
aiming to cut the supply of specific consumer tanks in WADI
(Table II), we found that the ML+Random setups failed on all
counts, whereas ML+GA could succeed across all sensors.
If attacks can only occur under strict condi-
tions, then a more sophisticated search algorithm
(e.g. GA) is necessary.
WADI’s tank level sensor 3 LT 001 (†) is a special case in
Table II: all four setups can generate the actuator commands
necessary to cause an underflow. However, it takes too long
to repeat the experiments, as once drained, it takes a very
long time for the tank in this phase to return to its normal
range. Our experiments were performed for SVR-GA only, but
since the other setups all found the right actuator configuration
immediately, we would expect to see similar results.
For some tank level sensors, smart fuzzing approached (but
did not cross) the over/underflow thresholds. One reason might
be that during the learning stage, not enough data was observed
that was relevant to the evolution of those sensors, leading to
a poorer prediction model. In future work, we will address
this by either fuzzing the actuators during the learning stage
(so that the model can train on some additional, abnormal
behaviours), or by using an online learning scheme in which
the model is updated over time as more data is observed. Some
sensed properties were not possible to attack at all and are
excluded from the table, e.g. the pressure sensor PIT501 which
was suffering a hardware fault at the time of experimentation.
Experiment #2: RQ 4. Our second experiment seeks to
compare the results of our smart fuzzing setups against those
of other approaches. As we are unaware of any existing
tools we can make a direct comparison with, we instead
make a comparison against two different baselines. First, we
compare against an automatic approach in which all of the
“smartness” is removed, and commands to the actuators are
simply generated and applied randomly, without reference to
any prediction model for the testbed (in contrast to LSTM-
Random and SVR-Random). Second, and in contrast, we
compare against the attacks of an established, expert-crafted
benchmark [29] (for SWaT only), which were systematically
derived from an attack model. For the different attacks derived
from these two sources, this experiment is roughly similar to
the first: launch them, and record which sensors are driven
into unsafe ranges (and at which time points). The idea of
the experiment is to establish where the effectiveness of smart
fuzzing can be positioned between two extremes: a simplistic,
uninformed search on the one hand; and an expert-crafted,
comprehensive benchmark on the other.
We ran the experiment as follows. For the random baseline,
we wrote a program to randomly generate 10 distinct sets
of actuator configurations. For each set in turn, we begin by
‘resetting’ SWaT to a normal state, using the same procedure
as the previous experiment. Once in such a state, we then
fuzzed the network to override the actuator states with the
given random configuration for 20 minutes. If during the run
any sensor readings were driven into an unsafe range, we
recorded the sensors (and ranges) in question, and the time
points at which they first became unsafe. After the run, the
system was allowed to reset, before repeating the process for
the other randomly generated configurations.
For the benchmark [29], we manually extracted all attack
sequences that were intended drive the system into unsafe
physical states. For each of these six attacks in turn, we
fuzzed the network manually to recreate the attack sequence,
overriding the sensor and actuator states as prescribed by the
benchmark. If during the run any (actual) sensor readings were
driven into an unsafe range, we recorded the sensors and time
points at which they first became unsafe. This was repeated
10 times for each attack sequence.
Results. The results of this experiment are given in the
bottom rows of Tables I–II. The numbers indicate the time
at which sensor entered an unsafe state for the first time. For
“Random (No Model)”, they are the medians across runs for 10
randomly generated actuator configurations; for “Benchmark”,
they are the medians across 10 repetitions for each of the six
attacks that target some unsafe state. The dashes (—) indicate
which sensors never reached an unsafe state.
In comparing these numbers with smart fuzzing (RQ4), it
appears that our approach drives more of the sensors to unsafe
states and does so faster. The comparison with Random (No
Model) makes clear that most of the attacks are not possible to
find by “accident”, or just by simply fuzzing at random without
any artificial or human intelligence. At the other end, the
comparison with the SWaT benchmark illustrates that smart
fuzzing was able to drive the system to six additional types
of unsafe states that were not covered by the benchmark.
Having said that, the benchmark does include several attacks
of the kind we do not consider (e.g. manipulating a sensor or
actuator, but without the goal of reaching an unsafe state); and
while its comparable attacks were slower than those of smart
fuzzing, efficiency was not necessarily a goal. The comparison
does however suggest that our approach could complement the
benchmark and improve its comprehensiveness.
Smart fuzzing complemented an established bench-
mark by covering six additional unsafe states.
Experiment #3: RQ 5. Our final experiment explores, by
means of a case study, whether smart fuzzing may have some
utility for testing the attack defence mechanisms of CPSs. As
these mechanisms are less established for WADI (e.g. forced
logic between actuators, which our method could easily
overcome), we considered SWaT’s “Water Defense” (WD)
solution [34], [24], which has demonstrated its efficacy many
times in the past (e.g. detecting attacks at professional SWaT
hackathons [30]). This attack detection mechanism is based on
monitoring several different expected conditions and invariants
of the system, and highlighting to the operator whenever one
of them is violated. Broadly speaking, WD monitors two kinds
of properties: (1) state-dependent conditions, and (2) physical
invariants. State-dependent conditions define expected rela-
tionships between sensors and actuators, e.g. “if motorised
valve MV101 is open, then the flow indicator FIT101 must
be non-zero” [30]. Physical invariants are properties that are
expected to always be true of a system behaving normally,
i.e. they mathematically characterise the physical process.
In this case study, we aimed to systematically drive each
sensor in SWaT towards an unsafe state while avoiding
detection by the monitors of WD. For a more fine-grained
assessment of the attack detection mechanism, we used it with
(1) all checks enabled; (2) only state-dependent conditions
enabled; and (3) only physical invariants enabled. Using our
SVR-GA setup and each fitness function in turn, we ran our
tools until either driving the targeted sensor to an unsafe
state, or violating an invariant. This was repeated for all
fitness functions and all three modes of the WD system. We
remark that in this experiment, the search algorithms were
constrained to manipulating only the actuators within stage(s)
of SWaT relevant to the targeted sensor. This was to reduce
the possibility of unnecessarily triggering alerts from stages
that were not directly relevant to the target of the attack.
Results. We found that when enabling all checks in WD,
or only the state-dependent conditions, smart fuzzing was
unable to successfully attack SWaT without detection. This is
unsurprising, as the attack detection mechanism is especially
effective at detecting process attacks: at the recent SWaT
hackathon, comprising teams from industry and academia, WD
was able to detect all but one of the process attacks involving
valve or pump manipulations, and more of the attacks than the
industry teams assigned to system defence [30].
However, smart fuzzing was able to successfully attack
two sensed properties—FIT501 (Low) and FIT601 (High)—
without detection by the physical invariants. This weakness
in the physical invariants could potentially be exploited by a
real attacker if they are able to spoof the sensor and actuator
values considered by the state-dependent conditions.
Attack #1. The first attack targeted the flow sensor FIT501
in stage five of SWaT (reverse osmosis process). The flow
sensor is associated with the two high-pressure pumps, P501
and P502, that pump the water in from stage four. Prior to
launching the attack, P501 was on and P502 was in standby.
To achieve the goal of decreasing the flow of FIT501, smart
fuzzing automatically generated and launched the following
simple attack over the star network of SWaT: turn off pump
P501; turn off P502. Within about 5 seconds, the flow through
the pipes reduces to zero, and FIT501 enters an unsafe state.
The physical impact of this attack is a reduction in reverse
osmosis production, with possible effects from the reduction
cascading through the system.
Attack #2. The second attack targeted the flow sensor
FIT601 in stage six of SWaT, which is a backwash process that
is intrinsically linked with the other stages. It stores purified
water from stage five, ready to be recycled back into stage
one; it also stores rejected water from stage five, ready to be
pumped to clean the ultra filtration of stage three.
To achieve the goal of increasing the value of FIT601, smart
fuzzing automatically generated and launched the following
attack over the star network of SWaT: open the motorised
valves MV301, MV302, MV303, MV304; turn on the pumps
P601 and P602; and ensure P301 and P302 are in the same
state. This actuator configuration increases the flow of FIT601
beyond acceptable levels from the moment the valves are
opened. At this stage, there are further physical consequences
of the attack, depending on whether smart fuzzing chose to
turn both P301 and P302 off or left them both on. In the
former case, ultra filtration is stopped completely, but water
continues to arrive from the backwash, leading to a reduction
of output for the process. In the latter case, ultra filtration is
still operating, but the increase in flow from the backwash
stage leads to the pressure increasing beyond the normal
operating values. From running the fuzzer through to reaching
the unsafe state, the attack takes approximately 15-20 seconds.
Smart fuzzing discovered two attacks that evaded
detection by the physical invariant monitors of the
established “Water Defense” mechanism for SWaT.
C. Threats to Validity
Finally, we remark on some threats to the validity of our
evaluation. First, our approach was implemented for CPS
testbeds: while they are real, fully operational plants based
on the designs of industrial ones, they are still smaller, and
our results may therefore not scale-up (this is difficult to
test due to the confidentiality surrounding plants in cities).
Second, the initial states of the testbeds were not controlled,
other than to be within their normal ranges, meaning that our
performance results may vary slightly. Finally, for testing CPS
attack detection mechanisms, we only studied an invariant-
based solution, meaning that our conclusions may not hold
for other types of defences (to be addressed in future work).
V. RELATED WORK
In this section, we highlight a selection of the literature
that is particularly relevant to some of the main themes of this
paper: constructing attacks, fuzzing, and assessing robustness.
We remark that related works on attack defence mechanisms
are discussed earlier in the paper in Section I, with some
mechanisms specific to SWaT/WADI discussed in Section II.
A number of papers have considered the systematic con-
struction or synthesis of attacks for CPSs in order to test (or
demonstrate flaws in) some specific attack detection mecha-
nisms. Liu et al. [50], for example, target electric power grids,
which are typically monitored based on state estimation, and
demonstrate a new class of data injection attacks that can
introduce arbitrary errors into certain state variables and evade
detection. Huang et al. [51] also target power grids, presenting
an algorithm that synthesises attacks that are able to evade
detection by conventional monitors. The algorithm, based on
ideas from hybrid systems verification and sensitivity analysis,
covers both discrete and continuous aspects of the system.
Urbina et al. [52] evaluate several attack detection mechanisms
in a comprehensive review, concluding that many of them are
not limiting the impact of stealthy attacks (i.e. from attackers
who have knowledge about the system’s defences), and suggest
ways of mitigating this. Sugumar and Mathur [53] address the
problem of assessing attack detection mechanisms based on
process invariants: their tool simulates their behaviour when
subjected to single stage single point attacks, but must first be
provided with some formal timed automata models.
Ca´rdenas et al. [54] propose a general framework for
assessing attack detection mechanisms, but in contrast to the
previous works, focus on the business cases between different
solutions. For example, they consider the cost-benefit trade-
offs and attack threats associated with different methods,
e.g. centralised vs. distributed.
Fuzzing has been a popular research topic in security
and software engineering for many years, but the goals of
previous works tend to differ from ours, which is a general
approach/tool for discovering CPS network attacks. Fuzzing
has previously been applied to CPS models, but for the goal of
testing them, rather than finding attacks. CyFuzz [55] is one
such tool, which offers support for testing Simulink models
of CPSs. American fuzzy lop [37] targets programs, and uses
GAs to increase the code coverage of tests and find more
bugs. Cha et al. [36] also target software, using white-box
symbolic analysis on execution traces to maximise the bugs
it finds in programs. A number of works (e.g. [56]) have
targeted the fuzzing of network protocols in order to test their
intrusion detection systems. In contrast, our work starts from
the assumption that an attacker has already compromised the
network, and uses ML-guided fuzzing to find the different
ways that such an attacker might drive the system to an unsafe
state. The attacks that it uncovers then form test suites for
attack detection mechanisms.
There are more formal approaches that could be used to
analyse a CPS and construct a benchmark of different attacks.
However, these typically require a formal specification, which,
if available in the first place, may be too simple to capture
all the complexities in the physical processes of full-fledged
CPSs. Kang et al. [57], for example, construct a discretised
first-order model of SWaT’s first three stages in Alloy, and
analyse it with respect to some safety properties. However, the
work uses very simple abstractions of the physical processes,
and only partially models the system (we consider all of
it without the need for any formal model). Castellanos et
al. [58] automatically extract models from PLC programs that
highlight the interactions among different internal entities of a
CPS, and propose reachability algorithms for analysing the de-
pendencies between control programs and physical processes.
McLaughlin et al. [59] describe a trusted computing base for
verifying safety-critical code on PLCs, with safety violations
reported to operators when found. Etigowni et al. [60] define
a CPS control solution for securing power grids, focusing
on information flow analyses based on (potentially verifiable)
policy logic and symbolic execution. Beyond these examples,
if a CPS can be modelled as a hybrid system, there are
several formal methods that can be applied to it, including
model checking [61], [62], SMT solving [63], non-standard
analysis [64], process calculi [65], concolic testing [66], and
theorem proving [67]. Defining a formal model that accurately
characterises enough of the physical process and its inter-
actions with the PLCs is, however, the hardest part. Smart
fuzzing in contrast can achieve results on real-world CPSs
without the need for specifying a model at all: it learns one
implicitly and automatically from the data logs.
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